

Paralegic Dimensions of Asymmetric Warfare: A Strategic Analysis of Resilience Policy Plan

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Abstract

Asymmetric warfare is a game of nerves and thoughts with least vigorous participation for large anticipated losses by creating partial or permanent paraplegia. Strategic analysis of asymmetric warfare since the World War I till the post-cold-war era exposit that the courage makes nations win the battle of warriors to battle of comrades. Despite preparations, asymmetric warfare has been difficult to fight due to uncertainty of circumstances and lethality of weapons. Thoughts before action may be the best-assumed strategy to mix Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) and Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) loop to develop the Paralegic Resilience Policy Plan (PRPP) to win asymmetric warfare. PRPP may serve to control and halt the ongoing wave of terrorism, guerrilla warfare and insurgencies. PRPP, along with a strategic work plan, is based on psychometric analysis to deal with any possible war condition and tactic to save millions of innocent lives. However, self-imposed epistemic dilemmas result in regret[s] that become the course of action. This is a descriptive study of war conditions with generic application of probability tests to find the best possible options and conditions to develop PRPP for any adverse condition possible. Innovation in technology begets modernisation in strategy to serve as a rheostat approach to deal with asymmetric warfare.

Keywords: Asymmetric Warfare, Psychometric Analysis, PRPP, OODA, Security.

Introduction

More and more, the war is prolonged less are the chances to win. Andrew J. R. Mack's 1975 article, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars" in global

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politics,¹ in which “asymmetric war” indicated a huge divergence in power between restricting participating actors in a contention. “Force” comprehensively comprehended to mean material force,² for example, an enormous armed force, complex weapons, a propelled economy, etc. Asymmetric warfare was the idea emerged from Greeks as Aristotle, Cicero, Clausewitz who stated that asymmetric warfare is a combat among the participants who are quite different from each other and comparison of their militaries seems implausible.³ Russians propagated this idea of Greeks such as Gen. Gerasimov’s doctrine in Russian military is a core strategy to deal with conflict in both military and non-military manner to win the asymmetric war by all possible means. By the late 1990s, new research expanding on Mack’s experiences was starting to develop and after 2004, the US military started handling the issues related to asymmetric warfare.

Conversation since 2004 has been muddled by the inclination of scholarly and military networks to utilise the term in various manners, and its nearby relationship with guerrilla fighting, revolt, fear-based oppression, counter insurgency and counterterrorism.⁴ Military creators will in general utilise the expression “asymmetric” to allude to the circuitous idea of the systems comprising of numerous powerless front-foot characters or hidden adversaries. Scholarly creators will in general spotlight on clarifying two riddles in deviated strife. In first case, core argument is that “power” decides success in strife, on the basis of the fact’s unstable participants choose to combat with cybernetic adversaries.⁵

Significant interpretations include that unstable participants/combatant may have distinct advantages such as may have radical partners; more substantiated combatants cannot make dangers believable.⁶ Most demands of such combatants are outrageous; they must consider its territorial

¹ Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” *World Politics* 27, no.2 (1975): 194.

² Ibid.

³ Petener Zrinko, “Assymmetric Warfare Not Every War has to End?,” *Secuirty and Defense Quarterly* 2, vol. 11 (2016): 30-44, <https://doi.org/10.35467/sdq/105400>

⁴ Heinz P. Dinter Jr., “*US Army Special Forces Roles in Asymmetric Warfare*,” Research Thesis, BS, University of Massachusetts, Lowell, Massachusetts (2001): 71.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Franklin B Miles, “Asymmetric Warfare: An Historical Perspective,” Research Report, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013 (March 1999): 35.

opponents when reacting to dangers from incredible unstable war characters. Secondly, “Power”, as ordinarily comprehended, conduces to triumph in war, at that point the triumph of the “weaker war participant” over the “strong war participant” is clarified.⁷ Important assumption of the aspect includes significant association; readiness of the powerless to endure more or bear greater expenses; outside help of powerless combatants; hesitance to raise viciousness with respect to strong war participants; war ideas; advancement of asymmetric adversaries’ perspectives towards time.⁸ Asymmetric clashes incorporate both interstate and common wars, and in the last 200 years have commonly been won by strong combatants. However, since 1950 weak and unstable war participants have won a greater part of every single asymmetric clash.⁹ i.e. Taliban’s guerrilla warfare in the terrains of Afghanistan, Iraq against NATO forces etc. One very recent happening of taking over Afghanistan within a month by Taliban forces is another example of an asymmetric warfare against regular combat force i.e. US-NATO forces equipped with the most sophisticated technology.¹⁰

Expected Challenges to Win Asymmetric Battles

Next to the ending of the Cold War a few military and security specialists felt that disputes will include ordinary fighting against an adversary with equivalent or at least comparable weapons on a known combat zone. War analysts state that small radical groups have posed a different kind of war which seems less planned with irregular assaults but results in higher loss and psychological disruption among the regular combatant forces.¹¹ In this way, asymmetric fighters fight at their terms employing weapon of their choice like using human bombs against significant forces, petroleum bombs against tanks, common airplane against high rises etc. An evident instance is the landmine against vehicles and military escorts, unrefined bombs on railroad tracks and inside worship places and unpredictable shooting of

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Michael A Allen, Sam R Bell and K Chad Clay, “Deadly Triangles: The Implications of Regional Competition on Interactions in Asymmetric Dyads,” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 14 (2) (2016): 169-190.

⁹ Miles, “Asymmetric Warfare: An Historical Perspective,” 15.

¹⁰ Raphael S. Cohen et al., “The Future of Warfare In 2030,” Research Report, RAND Corporation, 2020.

¹¹ K.C. Dixit, “The Challenges of Asymmetric Warfare,” Manohar Pakrikar Institute for Defence and Analyses, *IDSAs-comments*, March, 2010.

individuals in packed open spots.¹² This new type of battling is generally known as unbalanced fighting or a asymmetric war. Why unbalanced? Because both participants of the combat/clash are not having equal force, equipment, training and readiness.¹³

The CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) characterises asymmetric fighting as the utilisation of imaginative techniques, strategies and advancements by more unstable/weak state or non-state enemies that are planned to evade the qualities and adventure the potential vulnerabilities of a bigger and innovatively unrivalled adversary.¹⁴ This incorporates two viewpoints. First view is the utilisation of weapons or military assets by a state to counter predominant power while second view is the utilisation of political and other non-military strategies by a state to debilitate military activities of enemies.¹⁵

“Asymmetric Threat” is another term used to portray the weapons and strategies that average adversaries’ use to thwart or dodge the innovative prevalence of pioneering countries. The point is not to guarantee an area or to try and compromise the power of the rival.¹⁶ The essential target is to debilitate the enemy’s purpose and capacity to utilise its better traditional military ability viably rather than mediating in local clashes or to impede the objectives of maverick states or other incendiary gatherings.

The 26/11 sort of assault in Mumbai, the assault on the Indian Parliament in 2001, October 2009 GHQ Rawalpindi-Pakistan attack, the 9/11 assault on the World Trade Center in the United States (US), the bomb impact close to the Indian Embassy in Kabul, the Ormara, Makran coast attack in 2019,¹⁷ the PC hotel Gwadar Attack in the same year and New Zealand gun massacre of Muslims in mosque are a few instances of deviated fighting. The thought behind such assaults can be stretched out to

¹² Dinter Jr., “US Army Special Forces Roles in Asymmetric Warfare,” 16.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Eric V. Larson, et al., “Assessing Irregular Warfare, A Framework for Intelligence Analysis,” RAND Corporation, Arroyo Center (2008): 28.

¹⁵ K.C. Dixit, ‘The Challenges of Asymmetric Warfare’. *Manohar Pakrikar Institute for Defense and Analyses, IDSA-comments. (March, 2010).*

¹⁶ Eric V. Larson et al., “Assessing Irregular Warfare, A Framework for Intelligence Analysis,” 29.

¹⁷ Syed Ali Shah, “14 Offloaded from Passenger Bus, Shot Dead on Makran Coastal Highway,” *Dawn*, April 18, 2019.

any military circumstance where vulnerable rival can increase a bit of leeway through generally straightforward methods. A conspicuous model is the landmine or IED, which is not just modest and simple to circulate, plant and initiate but at the same time is hard for a rival to distinguish or counter.¹⁸

The most prompt recorded case of asymmetric fighting is contained in the Bible as the battle among David and Goliath.¹⁹ The story is typically referred to as a triumph of the feeble over the solid or the mistreated over the compelling, yet in basic military terms it speaks to the triumph of arranging and aptitude over savage power. In present day terms, it could be thought of as the utilisation of extended weapons and high mobility over contact weapons and defensive layer.²⁰

Possible Battlefields and Outcomes of Asymmetric Warfare

The strategic achievement in future wars relies upon one of two suppositions. One, when the sub-par (below normal) state is in a place of self-preservation; and also, when the inferior state is in influential position. Second, enduring an attack or occupation from an unchallenged force, it might be conceivable to utilise unpredictable strategies. For example, attempt at massacre and particular fights as a powerful method for war without ignoring/violating the laws of war. This was for example rehearsed in the Vietnam War and American Revolutionary War.²¹ In the last case, the inferior force is in a forceful position yet goes to strategies restricted by the laws of war, similar to the case in Chechnya.²²

Future dangers grasp the full range of irregular terrorising with which the nations may be confronted, from universal common defiance to accountability and straight up to low power clashes. Such dangers go from digital (cyber) fighting through psychological oppression or rebel state

¹⁸ Kristian Berg Harpviken and Mona Fixdal, "Anti-Personnel Landmines: A Just Means of War?," *Security Dialogue*, 28(3) (1997): 271-285.

¹⁹ Antony F. Campbell and Mark A. O'Brien, "Unfolding the Deuteronomistic History," *Fortress Press*, (2000):17.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Edwin Moise, *The A to Z of the Vietnam War* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 152.

²² Martin Malek, "Russia's Asymmetric Wars in Chechnya since 1994," *Connections* 8, no. 4(2009):81-98, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26326187>

atomic coercion to try and utilisation of weapons of mass devastation as much as national destabilisation emerging from mass movement.²³ In contrast to customary wars, where one armed force battles another military in open war zones, asymmetric wars will in general occur inside thickly populated urban territories.²⁴ A war in the urban landscape will undoubtedly make some regular citizen setbacks and extraordinary harm to non-military personnel and open property. The communication through photographs of dead citizens and demolished lanes have a solid effect for the gathering blockading the city and undermine the spirit of the assaulting power.²⁵ Regularly, the blockading party is utilising the resistance that regular people have under worldwide law so as to predict assaults on its warriors. Many combating forces utilise ‘Human Shield’ — a strategy, which is in any case a proclaimed atrocity yet which is likewise for the most part overlooked by the global media and human rights associations.²⁶

Paraplegic Resilience Policy Plan (PRPP)

Regional Security Complexes (RSC) are characterised as unmistakable and stable examples of security cooperation between combatants and war allies. They are recognised from each other by degrees of cooperation. The degree of communication between individuals from the equivalent RSC is high while between individuals from various RSCs it is relatively low.²⁷ Conflict formation among security communities involving security complexes depends on the degree of peacefulness in the area/region. As the name suggests local security buildings are commonly topographical, comprising of neighbouring entertainers and being protected from each other by normal hindrances, for example, seas, deserts and mountain ranges. Singular states can likewise work all things considered “protectors/shields” between RSCs.²⁸

²³ Wolff Heintschel Von Heinegg, “Asymmetric Warfare: How to Respond?,”

International Law Studies, vol. 87 (2011): 472,

<https://digitalcommons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1089&context=ils>

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Aarti Iyer et al., “Understanding the Power of the Picture: The Effect of Image Content on Emotional and Political Responses to Terrorism,” *Journal of Applied social Psychology* 2014, <https://doi.org/10.1111/jasp.12243>

²⁶ Nadia Mushtaq Abbasi, “Impact of Terrorism on Pakistan,” *Strategic Studies*, vol. 33, no. 2 (Summer 2013): 33-68 <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48527612>

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) sets that regional participant's activities and inspirations in the field of worldwide security which is intensely regional in nature, Fig no. 2. This implies that a participant's security concerns are principally created in their quick neighbourhood. The security of every non-state actor in an area connects with the security of different belligerents or participant states. Because of the way, in which contiguousness works; there is frequently serious security reliance inside RSC, yet cooperation with outsiders is substantially less dynamic.

The hypothesis is convoluted by presence of non-state actors with worldwide security interests and power projection capacities. Notwithstanding, Barry & Buzan are of the view that for even global economic and military forces security significance is usually regional in nature. Their inclusion in local security issues ought to be frequently observed as they are not as incredible force, issues entering an RSC, despite the fact that they have probability of happening again.²⁹

RCSs can be deciphered as frameworks for war participants as "smaller scale" frameworks implanted in a bigger worldwide political framework.³⁰ RCSs contain their own security elements which are in ordinary conditions to a great extent free from worldwide security elements. This empowers the utilisation of different International Relations (IR) ideas, for example, level of influence, extremity and association on a regional scale. Further refining the hypothesis are the ideas of regional sub complexes (basically RSCs inside RSCs) and super complexes (the bordering of neighbouring RSCs). Barry Buzan foresees security interests as basically local/regional in nature. This is contrary to a view — overwhelming during the Cold War — that considers security to be as an impression of worldwide incredible force interests.³¹ They point to the Middle East for instance, where the security scene has seen no successful change in spite of the closure of the Cold War.³²

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Barry Buzan, "Regional Security Complex Theory in the Post-Cold War World," in Söderbaum F. and Shaw T.M.eds., *Theories of New Regionalism*, . International Political Economy Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London (2003): 123-135, https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403938794_8

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

Amalgamation of RSCT and Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) loop (a tactical strategy of the US Air force) may give a plausible policy dimension to handle Asymmetric warfare in activating paraplegic dimensions for resilience development.³³ OODA loop strategy is observed at each degree of the military: Grand Strategy, Strategy, Grand Tactics and Tactics:

- a) Grand Strategy — there was an OODA circle that took four years and stages between political decision cycles.
- b) Strategy — response to happenings that may occur through the span of a quarterly arrangement.
- c) Tactical aspects — response strategy for the span of a day or week.
- d) Tactics — response strategy: OODA that occurs in a small amount of a second inside a unit officer's brain on the combat zone.³⁴


So, under the light of theoretical to chronological study of war tactics, thought process and response behaviours research develops (Paraplegic Resilience Policy Plan) PRPP employing war strategies of RSCT and OODA loop to extract workable action strategies to counter asymmetric war acts and trends. Fig no.1. is diagrammatic representation of the concept to develop warfare strategies in particular against asymmetric warfare trends. Similarly, to OODA loop strategies measured at different military stages, there are OODA circles working at various degrees of your regular day to day existence.³⁵ What you do on a given day takes care of your direction for when you are arranging your week-long strategy. As strategy decides that what you do in seven days takes care of your direction for the coming month, etc.

³³ Col. John. R. Boyd, "A Discourse on Winning and losing," Air University Press Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education Maxwell AFB, Alabama (March 2018): 11.

³⁴ Ibid., 55-64.


³⁵ Ibid.

Figure No.1
PRPP



Source: Diagram prepared by the authors

Figure No.2
Regional SecurityComplexTheory (RSCT)



Source: Regional SecurityComplexTheory (RSCT)³⁶

Core functionality of the OODA includes, Firstly, *Mutual Trust* – in request for groups to adequately utilize the OODA circle, they should have common trust based on a base of imparted esteems and joined to long periods of taking a shot at troublesome difficulties together. Secondly, *Intuitive Skill* – as you get progressively talented in a specific space, you can build up an instinctive aptitude that let you move across the OODA loop far more quickly and effectively get surrounded by enemy’s OODA loop. Lastly, *Focus* – instead of demanding a bit-by-bit plan, classify a goal of convergence and adapt the approaches expected to be utilised.³⁷

PRPP is a systematic response of asymmetric strategies in any combat zone with best possible outcomes against most strong enemies. RSCT-strategies extracted i.e. circumvent manoeuvring, Blind Attack, Exhausted Blurredness and Metastatic messaging is when processed under OODA loop it gives possibly wining results. With a lot of rigorous study and

³⁶ Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Society*, (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 6-20, 41-47, 77-82.

³⁷ Boyd, “A Discourse on Winning and Losing,” 199.

analysis of war situations, in asymmetric warfare case these strategies may work in plausible manner with affirmative outcomes. In the result, PRPP's four principal strategies outlines are i.e. paraplegic Status-Quo, Shock Paralysis Response, Systematic Silence and Collective Retaliation. These principles can be tested in further war cases and situations to be workable and feasible in wide range of war arrays.

Psychometric Analysis of War Stressors

Estimation of war stressors requires instruments that would be increasingly touchy to explicitness of the situation-based encompassing terrible accidents. While 'War Stressors Assessment' questionnaire covers a wide range of complex awful encounters which are extraordinary concerning a portion of their qualities and which some of the time happen together. The acquired outcomes bolster the supposition that war awful accidents are more organised than non-military personnel horrible mishaps.³⁸ Factual investigation has demonstrated that the subscales of the presentation to explicit classifications of war stressors which are essential; some portion of the War Stressors Assessment Questionnaire have great measurement qualities and are clinically material. Contrasts in the relationships between the subscales of stressors and the proportions of psychopathology propose the intricacy of cooperation between the unique injury and a resulting mental turmoil. This recommends two prospects: a) individual physical injury does not altogether partake in the elements of clutter improvement, or b) individual injury prompts battle withdrawal and going with decrease of introduction to stressors.³⁹ In any case, one astounding outcome was demonstrating that the dynamic battle presentation does not connect with most proportions of psychopathology aside from with evasion estimated by the Integrated Environmental Services (IES).⁴⁰ This result suggests that the dynamic job over the span of awful mishap might have negative connection with the psychopathology.

³⁸ A Fontana and R Rosenheck, "Traumatic War Stressors and Psychiatric Symptoms Among World War II, Korean and Vietnam War Veterans," *Psychology and Aging*, vol. 9, 1 (1994): 27-33, doi:10.1037//0882-7974.9.1.27

³⁹ Fontana, and Rosenheck, "Traumatic War Stressors and Psychiatric Symptoms Among World War II, Korean and Vietnam War Veterans," 30, doi:10.1037//0882-7974.9.1.27

⁴⁰ S. Guloksuz et al., "Exposure to Environmental Factors Increases Connectivity between Symptom Domains in the Psychopathology Network," *BMC Psychiatry* 16, (2016): 223, <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12888-016-0935-1>

High connections were gotten for subscales which are expected to quantify war-related hardship and the loss of hierarchical or military structure. In the event that we take a gander at the subscales grouped by the level of their relationship with psychopathology, it is noticed that there is a high connection for the subscales in which the subject's job is incredibly inactive, for example, detainment/torment, life in antagonistic encompassing, loss of structure, hardship and battle introduction (legitimizing the detachment of this subscale from the subscale of dynamic battle). It is conceivable that this finding has general importance since it is anything but difficult to perceive the indications of damaging impact of exactly the same component of the loss of command over supporting possibilities under studied vulnerability.

When we consider the previously mentioned relationships between the sorts of pressure and psychopathology, we ought to likewise tolerate as a main priority the heterogeneity of the example on which the investigations have been performed. It is conceivable, for instance, that the subjects altogether contrast in a portion of the factors identified with character measurements which could be liable for various connections of the sorts of upsetting events. This end requires exact approval since it might have critical ramifications. The examinations identified with the misery scales from the War Stressors Assessment Questionnaire and the connection between the trouble scales (abstract responses to experienced stressors) and the presentation and psychopathology, because of their degree and multifaceted nature will be the subject of a different research.

Strategic Preference Range Analysis

Estimated results of psychometric analysis of war-stressors was then studied in reference to the US State department report on channels of asymmetric warfare is discussed in the US army war college thesis.⁴¹ Purposeful imprecision of personality, conceivably through incognito 'tasks of extremists is metaphorically 'swimming in the ocean of the individuals.' US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld's expression that channels of marshy response from asymmetric combatants or guerrilla warriors is like to chase the fish, though with the specialist danger of heightening and

⁴¹ Lloyd J. Matthews, "Challenging The United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America Be Defeated?," US Army War College. Pennsylvania, 1998.

unfriendly exposure.”⁴² Such ‘seepage’ would be exhaustive and would require huge assets: eccentric associations regularly advantage from *Command and Control (C2)* structures that are broadly scattered (by mishap or plan) and hard to assault.⁴³ Albeit such divided C2 have recently brought about decreased proficiency, current asymmetric and unconventional warfare correspondence frameworks (counting encoded Internet use) may change this irregularity. Besides, where the contention is across the board, there might be willing substitutions hanging tight for a chance to step in and proceed with the battle.

According to the report, calculated powerlessness is probably going to be weighed against an expeditionary power, as the ‘home’ player has the benefit of shorter stock lines and likely fewer modern necessities.⁴⁴ The capacity of less unpredictable powers to extemporise will balance distinctly with the requirement for high innovation, high volume support for current expeditionary fighting. Expeditionary powers are especially defenceless against disturbance in the passage phase of an activity.⁴⁵ So an early assault before sufficient power had been collected stays a ‘most perilous’ strategy: this may slow the pace of power develop or redirect exertion into additional barrier.⁴⁶ The authentic standard for significant Western tasks has incorporated to extended developed stage in a protected back territory. Western powers are combat prepared where they considered almost all techniques either by ‘ordinary,’ for example, damage or psychological oppression, or by the risk of Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD).

Specifically, the defencelessness of the residential versatility foundation stays a conceivably basic zone that will be incredibly hard to protect.⁴⁷ The Western innovative bit of leeway will be troublesome yet not difficult to check. It isn’t predictable that a potential rival will have the option to handle

⁴² Mackubin Thomas Owen, “Reflections On Future War,” *Naval War College Review*, 61(3) (2008): 61-76. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26396944>

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Matthews, “Challenging The United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America Be Defeated?.”

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Thomas. L. McNaugher, “The Real Meaning of Military Transformation: Rethinking the Revolution,” *Foreign Affairs*, January 2007, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/2007-01-01/real-meaning-military-transformation-rethinking-revolution>

⁴⁷ Ibid.

the expansiveness of frameworks accessible toward the West. In spite of the fact that likeness may be feasible in some restricted, however, basic territories. This may be through innovation move, (for example, the Mujahidin securing of Stinger rockets) or by business redistributing of double use things (as in the instance of business satellite symbolism or business cryptographic items).

Conclusion

The US has taken in a lot about how to wage counterinsurgency and counterterrorist battles and how troublesome and expensive they can be. This is a special chance to make shrewd and focused on interests in advancements appropriate for low-power military tasks that will keep on being a staple of future clashes. However, as history has appeared, deviated fighting isn't leaving and on the off chance that anything, it is just going to get increasingly risky. Research has explored different war scenarios and strategies along with their outcomes. Most importantly comparison of the regional survey of militants from psychologists' views was compared with the US state department study on asymmetric warfare channels. It helped to create sound ground for developing paraplegic resilience strategy to fight against asymmetric warfare which is trending in worldwide battlegrounds i.e. war between weak and strong belligerents.

In this context, PRPP may serve the purpose well to deal any herculean foe in contrast to weak victim. In most cases calculated madness is needed to such high weaponry wars on the surface of earth rather than equal military power and combat designs. This policy approach would prove its worthwhile dealing in weak victim/response state versus strong attacking state. It may further open huge range of research and study where each PRPP strategy would be applied and tested on targeted population/simulation to develop wide ranging and specific zone-based strategic war plan.