Deterrence or Provocation: Establishment of Naval Bases on Islands in the Indian Ocean

Abstract

This study investigates the conditions under which naval bases on Indian Ocean islands, Diego Garcia (U.S./UK), Andaman and Nicobar (India), and Hambantota (Sri Lanka/China), deter rival states or likely to provoke escalation, emphasising the role of small-state agency in cases involving distinct host or leasing states. Integrating deterrence theory, securitisation, and critical geopolitics, it develops a novel typology incorporating base characteristics (scale, transparency, location), regional responses, and non-traditional factors like debt dynamics and environmental impacts. Using a mixed-methods approach, archival research, discourse analysis, geospatial imagery, AIS data, and three-player game-theoretic modelling (India-China-small state), the paper analyses how transparency and island-state mediation reduce escalation risks, while opaque financing and postcolonial grievances amplify provocation. Findings show Diego Garcia achieves effective deterrence amid postcolonial tensions, Andaman and Nicobar fosters stabilised coexistence despite ecological concerns, and Hambantota drives provocative escalation mitigated by Sri Lankan agency. Policy recommendations propose maritime confidence-building measures (CBMs) via IORA and Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), including transparency protocols and debt relief, to enhance Asia-Pacific stability. By foregrounding small states and non-traditional factors, this study refines maritime IR scholarship and informs regional security strategies.